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In the Supreme C.ourt of the State of Utah
WILLIAM N. CHRISTIANSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

- vs -

Case No.

10731

VINCENT L. REES, DOE I
and DOE II, and the
8ALT LAKE CLINIC, a
proft>ssi on al corpora ti on,

Def Pndants-RespondPnts.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF

TI-rn~

CASE

'rl1is is an action, instituted in 19G5, for medical malpractice in the performance of surgery in 1955, during
\\-hich it is claimed a portion of a surgical needle was left
in appt> llan t's body.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A f t(~r tlrn pretrial hearing, and upon consideration
of appdlant's deposition and the memoranda of authori1 i<>s submitted by counsel, the court entered a judgment
o.f dismissal with prejudice because the action was barred
lir the Statute of Limitations.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts is incomplt-te, sincP
it fails even to mention n10st of t110 fads npon 'rhich
tlw judgment of the lower court was based. Respondent~
therefore now set forth additional facts, with supporting
eitations to appellant's de110sitio.n, a eopy of which wac;
considered by the court under stipulation by tlw partif:'~
(R. 9), and the original of which has since be(_'ll pnl1lished and made a part of the r0rord here as pagP 1-1-.
Respondent Dr. Rees iwrforuwd snrgen· upon app1·llant in 1951 and 1952 and on April 12, 1955, hP excis<'d
a portion of appellant's rPcturn. After relt-ase frorn
L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake City, appellant n•turned to
his home in ~f ayfiPld, Utah, and rn'ver again communicated with Dr. Rees or his associates (Deposition 9, 10.
11, 14). Appellant's post-operative medical can' wa~
rendered by Dr. Davidson, a physician practicing i11
central Utah.
There has been no doctor-patient relationship or
communication beween appellant and rPspondents sinel'
the hospital discharge in April J953 (Deposition i.J:),
From the tinw of the o.perntion of April, 19G5, until
at least the date of his deposition, N overnber 11, 1%5,
appellant has had a continuing pain near the anus an<l
tail born'. There has been no change in tht> location
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natun~ o.f the pain (Deposition 12, 13, 22). It covers
an an·a of about one inch or a little more and appellant
l'Hn frel pain at tlw same point each time he sit::; flat or
so that the arPa is being pressed, and he can feel pain
at tlH• same point if he presses it \vi th his fingers (Depo::;it ion 12, 13, 38, 42). It is a steady, constant pain, which
appellant has experienced "through the ten years smce
tlw operation" (Deposition 22).
111'

In Jul;·, l 962, seven y<>arn after the operation, the
eamw of the pain \\·as diagnosed as a small pirce of a
;;urµ;ical ncedle in the appellant's hody which the appellant nm,- alleges was lrft thPn' during the 1955 operation.
Tlw long period o.f time \Yhich elapsed from the oper;dion to the time the ne<>dle was discovt'I'ed was drn• to the
fad that tlt1• ap1wllant rnacle no significant effort to
diseo,ver thP m)PClle in spite of thP fact that he experi1·n(·Pd continuous pain at the point of the incision. He
a,:kpd Dr. Davidson about it "on and off" and described
to him thP pain "and all about it" (Deposition 19). He
1wv1'!' rdnrnPd to the respondent's office or call<•<l or
11 rntr• to complain o.f the pain or to attempt to discover
its eans<> (Deposition pp. 13-1+, +-±), even though lw has
1·n11H' to the Salt Lake ar<'a at lc)ast once a ;-ear ever sincP
t\1p op<·1·ntion (DPpoRition p. -1--1-).

'L'l1c• appellant sought medical assistance only in n'L'.<ll'11

to unrdatPd nih1wnts, so that an)· refrrencP to the
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pain was casual or incidental to the main purpos0 o,f th("
visit. The only physicians he saw during tlw ReVPn yPar
period were Drs. Stewart, Endsley, Rurnel, Vilrn and
Davidson (Deposition, p. 23). He saw Dr. Rtcwart for
a lung condition (Deposition, p. 16), Dr. Endsley wa~
consulted for a kidney stone condition, Drs. Viko and
Rumel were seen in regard to a chest condition (Deposition, p. 23), and the appellant's family physician, Dr.
Davidson, was consulted after the short period of postoperative care only in regard to a kidney stone condition
(Deposition, p. 17), and the pain was mentioned to Dr.
Davidson only casually and not upon every visit (Deposition, pp. 19, 44). Thus, if it were not for th0se otlwr
ailments, the needle would remain undiscovere<l as its
discovery was incident to the kidney stone condition
(Deposition, p. 15). The casual manner in ·which tht>
pain was mentioned was undoubtedly a great factor in
not creating the alarm on the part o.f these doctors to
lead them to take the necessary steps to discover tlw
needle at an earlier date.
The lack of concern on the part of the appellant in
discovering the needle was despite the fact that he experienced continuous pain which was fixed in the area of
the operation (Deposition, p. 13). The appellant's testimony in regard to the seven-year delay in discovering tlw
needle is as follmvs (Beginning at Page 19 of his <lPpo:-:ition) :

"A. I asked Davidson on and off if it would get
better. He said that as time went on it should,
hut it has not.

to him the pain and all

Q.

Did you
about it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did he ever suggest to you that you go back
to the Salt Lake Clinic and complain about it 7

A.

No.

Q.

Or hack to Dr. Hees and complain about

A.

No.

Q.

It is your memory of this chain of events,
that this pain first became noticeable to you,
the pain in your sit down area someplace,
became noticeable to you after the 1955 operation"?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You never had it before?

A.

No.

Q.

And after the bandages were no longer needed
to be changed, and -the rectum incision had
healed, then you felt this pain from that time
forward'?

clf~scrihe

it~
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A.

Yes.

Q.

When several months went by and it didn't
heal, and you had the pain all along, you
decided then there must be something wrong-,
but you didn't know what it was, is that it?

A.

That is it.

Q. You didn't make complaint to Davidson about
that for a year or

more~

A.

I've always complained that there was pain
there.

Q.

Did he examine the

A.

He would feel over it, look at it, but he never
took x-rays.

Q.

And you never, to repeat again, you nevPr
either wrote, phoned or went in personally
to the Salt Lake Clinic or Dr. Rees to complain about this pain that didn't go awa"d

A.

No, I didn't."

area~

Later, near the end of his deposition, appellant was
asked, and he testified, beginning at Page 42, as follows :
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''Q.

Now in the period from 1955 up to the time
that you filed the suit, as I understand your
testimony, you have had throughout that period this pain that is actually in your sit-down
area or seat, and you have told me covers an
area of about one inch or more that you,
yourself, can feel if you press on it, is that
true?

A.

That is trne.

Q.

Now why
'62, when
you, why
operated

A.

"Well, we had our doctor down there and we
consulted him, not maybe every time we were
there about it, but I thought that would be
sufficient.

Q.

And that would be Dr. Davidson?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Were you sEmt to Dr. Davidson by Dr. Rees?

A.

No, he asked who the family doctor was at the
time.

Q.

He wanted somebody to he able to change
the bandages?

not between the period o.f 1955 and
the thing was continuing to bother
didn't you go hack to the man that
on you?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you ever intend to bring this matter nf
this continued pain over the one-inch area or
whatever the area is in, to Dr. Rees' att<.·ntion but you never got around to it1

A.

As I told you before, I never seen Dr. Rees
from the time I left his office until this dafr.

Q.

Did you have in mind to do that, bnt just
never got around to doing it?

A.

Well, when you are out like we are you don't
have that privilege every day, to contact them
and ask them that question.

Q.

Are you telling me that in seven years, in a
seven-year period, you never went hack to
Salt Lake City?

A.

Yes, I was there.

Q.

In the periods I spoke about \Vere you there
at least once a

year~

A.

I imagine.

Q.

Did you ever apply for an appointnwnt at tlw
clinic to see Dr. Rees in that period from
1955 to 1962 about the pain in your sPat, the
period of seven years ?
0

A. No."
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'l'here is no explanation or reason advanced in the
record for the three-year delay, after discovery of the
nePdlP, before the suit was filed. The total time since
tlw alleged negligent act and the time the appellant
filP<l the suit is 1014 yPars.
ARGUMENT
THI£ TRIA:L COURT

·wAS

CORRECT IN

DISMISSING THE APPELLANT'S ACTION
BECAUSE IT IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The development of the law on the question of when
thP statute of limitations begins to nm in a malpractice
adion can he easily followed hy rpference to the annotations in 74 A.L.R. 3Hl ( 1931) ; 1-t4 A.L.R. 209 ( 194-3) ;
SO A.L.R. 2d 370 (1961). These annotations reveal that
thP general rule in the United States is that the statute
of limitations begins to run in malpractice actions from
the time of the negligent act. There are two generally
n~cognized exceptions to this general rule: ( 1) if negligt•nt treatment continues after the negligent act that
directly caused the damage, the statute does not begin
to run until the treatment terminates; (2) if the defendant know::-; of the damage caused by his own negligence,
and ath'mpts to conceal it from tlw plaintiff, or affirmatiwly misleads the plaintiff, the statute is tolled during

tlw period of the fraud.
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Neither of the above exceptions to the genral rule is
involved in the instant case. The annotations point ont
a minority rule, represented by the California cases cited
in the appellant's brief, that the statute of limitations
doPs not begin to run until the damage is discovered by
the plaintiff.
Utah has clearly rejected the California discovery
rule and has followed the viFw of the majority of jurisdictions. In Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah 37, 38 P.2d 712
(1934), the d1:>fendant had negligently left a piece of metal
in the plaintiff's throat during a tonsilk•ctomy. 'l'hP
doctor-patient relationship continued up until two years
before the plaintiff commenced suit. Howev0r, thP Court
found that the purpose of the plaintiff's co.ntinuing visits
to the def Pndant's office had no connPction with tlw
throat condition. The plaintiff did not discovPr the rondition until 1932, which was 7 years aftc>r the operation.
Upon appeal, plaintiff argu0d that thP four-year
statute of limitations did not bar the action since the
statute did not begin to run until the doctor-patient relationship had terminated. The Court recognized tli<>
validity of the "continuing treatment" exception to tlw
general rule, but held that since the continuing treatment did not relate to any of the df ects of the metal
object, the statute commenced to run from the time of
the operation. Hence, the Supreme Court held that the
statute of limitations was not tolled during the time that
the plaintiff was unaware of his elaim.
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In I'etdcr v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244
( 19:-32), the Utah Supreme Court applied the continuing
tl<'atment exception, and thus found the statute to he no
bar to the action. However, by way of dictum, the court
stated:
"Had we a case where the only negligence
allt>g0d was the negligt>nt and unskillful operation
in removing the tonsils, and nothing more, let it
lw assumed that thP ranse of action ac('rued at the
tinw of the commiss:on and completion of such
operation, and, if an action has0d on such negligPncP alone \\'as not comm<>ncPd within fonr years
tlwreafter, the har of th0 statut<~ would lw eompldt>, though thP consequential damages or injUJriPs resulting from such negligencp were not
ascertained or 1nade manifest until after tlw statute had run."
AppPllant attPrnpts to avoid thP eff Pct of Passey v.
Budge by contending the opinion of tlw Court on the
statntP of limitations problern was mere> ol1iter r?icturn.
ThP reporkd dPcision contradicts appellant's contention.
Plain ti ff-appdlant in that case arg1wd only two points:
First, that th<> trial eourt erred in holding that "the
(•ansp of art ion was barr0d by thP statnt<> of limitations"
nrnl, SPcond, that it was error to hold the evidence was
iw:uffic·i<•ut as a matter of law (38 P.:?d at page H, first
<'oh1111n). Tlw Supr0mP Court, in thosP portions of its
11pinions found on pages 714--717, din•ctly discnss<>d tlw
limitations issued and r0jPrtPd tlw ap1wllant's claim of
1·r1·nr. SPP pag<> '717.
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Appellant here attacks also the Peteler case upon
the same ground - that its language on the limitation
issue was only dicta. Again, the Suprem(• Court itsp]f
disagrees. In P(l;ssey v. Budge, the Conrt ref0rrPd to thr
language of the Peteler case on the limitation isstw as
"the doctrine o.f the PetelE>r v. Robison" case, and statPd
that the "principle of law laid down in that case is corred." (Page 717, first column, in 38 P. 2d.)
Neither of these cases has rJPen overruled or modified by the Supreme Court. The facts and principles of
Passey v. Budge are strikingly similar to the case at
bar, and while appellant asks, in the name of "suhstantial justice" that he be allowed to submit his cast> to a
jury, the Supreme Conrt, in Passr>y, clearly statf>d:

"lt must be remembered that the statut<> of
limitations is a legal, and not an equitable, <lPfense. It is availablf~, regardless of equities, if
the facts are such as to warrant the inteq)osition
o.f the plea."
E-ven if the equities \Vere to be considered, they are in
favor of the respondent, Dr. Rees. Substantial justict'
should not require a person to def end a claim which is
more than 10 years old and which has run two and onehalf times the limitation period. This is esp<>eially true
in the circumstances of this casP wh0re tlw delay eo.uld
have been prevented by the exercise of even a slight
degree of diligence on th<> part of tlw ap1wllant.
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The appellant argues that this Court should defer
to tlH' views of the California court and reverse its present position. However, as is cl<>ar from the latest annotation, 80 A.L.R 2d 3G8, the position of California among
tlw jnrisdictions ruling on the question is unique, to the
(:;dent that there is a section in the annotation, at page
390, headed "California Rule.''
:\foreowr, the very cases cited by appellant from
California, and otlwrs not cited, recognize that even
if a plaintiff has not discov<>red that he has a cause of
ar~tion, the statute will neverthelPss start to run if the
plaintiff has knowledge of facts l\'hich should put him
<111 inquir>' as to tlu' f'XistPnce of a cause of action.
Ilw;trative is Stafford v. Sliiiltz, 259 P.2d 494 (Calif.
1952), in which the defendants negligPntly treated plaintiff's lPg, causing serious infection which eventually re;.:nlt<>d in amputation of th<> leg. The neglig('nt acts
occmTPd long befon" the one-year period of the California statute of limitations. The plaintiff had knowlPdge of the deteriornting condition of his leg more than
<11w >-ear ht>fore snit was fik'd, hut d;d not learn that
the defondant's negligence was the cause of this condition until a lakr date which was within the one year
11<'riorl of the California statute. The California District
Court of Appeal held that the statutP began to nm from
the tinw that the plaintiff kne1y of the condition of his
l<'µ;, i-;ince that knowledge should havu put him on inquir:v
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as to any possible claim against the def 0ndant. HencP,
the suit was barred, and demurrers to th0 complaint
were properly sustained, despite the fact that the plaintiff was actuall>- unaware of his claim.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, thP
principle upon which the ruling was based ·was upheld
hut the Supreme Court reversed the decision upon tlw
ground that the complaint nndPr attack alleg<~d fraud
and misreprPsentation by the dPfondants, which allegation presentPd "sufficient facts to toll the statute of
limitations.'' Stafford v. 8l111ltz (Calif. 195-t), 270 P. 2d 1.
In its decif'ion, the SuprPme Court of California exprPssly rPeognizPd that, ahs0nt other considerations such
as the allPgation of fraud and misrepresentation, the
statute runs from the date of the negligent act. This
year, that court relied upon Stafford v. Shultz in deciding
an action for legal malprnctire. Alter 11s. "11 ichacl (Calif.
1966), 413 P.2d 153.

In Hurlimann v. Bank of America National Trust
& Savings Association, 297 P.2d 682 (Calif. 1956), thr
court stated that a plaintiff, in order to benefit by thP
California discovery rule, must show that he is not at
fault for not making an earlier discovery of his claim,

and that he had no knowledge of facts that should havP
put him on inquiry. Other jurisdictions whieh follow
the California rule also rPquire that the plaintiff show
that he had no knowledgP of facts that should have put
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him on inquiry as to any possible claim~ d~ages.
1
E. G. Hahn v. Claybrook{tdlOO Atl. 83 (~af 4965);
~.2
pQ/
{~-<..
Weinstein v. Blanchard,
Atl. ~ (N.J.
). Appellant has made no such showing by his pleadings or
tPstlmony in this case.
The Montana case cited by appellant, Johnson v. St.

Patrick's Hospital, 417 P.2d 469 (Montana 1966), and the
commentary on the case quoted by appellant in his
hrief, clearly qualify the discovery rule, limiting its
application to siutations where the plaintiff was diligent
in his attempts to discover his injury.

It is thus clear that in cases in which courts have
applied the discovery rule and tolled the statute, the
plaintiff involved either alleged exceptions to the genrral rule or that he was diligent in discovery and prosecuting his cairn. Hmvever, in the instant case, the plaintiff made no effort to find the cause of the pain which
he experienced after the 1955 operation. The pain was
constant, it was in a small area, it did not shift its
location, and appellant never had it before. Despite all
this, the pain was mentioned only incidentally in connection with treatment for other unrPlated ailments. Although he had ample opportunity, he made no attempt to
see the respondent or to take any o.thPr action to ascertain the problem.
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Had the appellant made any real effort to discowr
the source of his pain, or had he brought it to the attention of the respondent, his cause of action would almost
certainly have been discovc'rc>d within th<> four ~-ear limitation period.
The latest California cases rPspondents have het•n
able to find reaffirm the proposition that the plaintiff
may still be barred, despite the "California rule", if he
knows facts which would reasonably put him on notice of
inquiry. See opinions of Supreme Court of California
in Stafford v. Shultz, 270 P.2cl 1, cikd in Thompson 1·.
Fresno, 381 P.2d 92-t
1

Plaintiff also cited Arizona and Colorado cases to
support his position. However, it should he noted that
neither of the cases cited from these jurisdictions adopt
the California rule. The cases were decided under tlw
exceptions to the majority rule. In Rosane v. Sc11gcr,
149 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1944), the court found that thl'
defendant had fraudulently conC('aled his nPgligence fr0111
the plaintiff, and on this ground held the statuk had
no·t commenced to run. Similar grounds were the basis
of the Arizona decision in Morrison 1!. Action, 198 P.2d
590 (Ariz. 1948).
Furthermore, it has heen held that the doctrine of

laches may prf'rlucle rerovel)- in spit<> of the adoption of
the California rule. The Supreme Court of Idaho ap-
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parently adopted the California discovery rule in Billings
v. Sisters of lllercy of Idaho, 389 P.2d 224 (Idaho 19G-!).
It is note>d, howeve>r, the Idaho court specifically ruled
that failure to use due diligence, after being put on
notice of facts which should incite inquiry, might haT
tlw claim. Later, in a federal diversity case, thP :Ninth
Circuit interpTeted the Idaho Court as adopting the
discovery rule with some reservation. The Federal Court
held that a daim which was nine years old may he barred
hy t!te doctrine of laches, in spite of the fact that during
the nine years the plaintiff was unaware of his claim.
Owens v. White, 342 F.2d 817 (9th Circuit 1965).
In the instant case, actual discovery was made in
19G2, and suit was filed more than three years lateT.
'l'lrns, tlw rlaim was more than h'n yt>ars old at the time
t!te suit was file>d, and tlwrefore, even unde>r the discovery rule, the equitable doctrine of lnches should bar
this suit.
'l'he pntire> issut> involved in the instant case may be
dispos<•d of by reference to the Utah statutes. The issue
involved arises because of the appellant's argument that
tlwrp is no designation in our statutes as to when the
fom yPar limitation period of St>ction 78-12-25 should
lwgin to run. However, a carPful n'ading of the code

n·wals that there is such a

d<~signation.

Utah Code

Nection 78-12-1 prt>scribes that thP various limitation
pniods stated throughout Chapter 12 of Title 78 shall
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commence to run "after the cause of action shall hav"
accrued ... " The Supreme Court of Karn~as has ronstrued identical statutory language to iiwan that tli1•
limitation periods must run from tllP datP of tlw negligent ruct, precluding the court from designating any other
point of time. Hill v. Hayes, 395 P.2d 298 (Kansas 19G-t).
The legi:-;lative history of the statute of limitatiom
provision applirahle in the instant ca~-w is enlightc>ningon this problem. Prior to 1951 the personal injury statutP
of limitations provided that:
.. An action for rt>lief not otlterwii'w proviclPd
for mnst he commenced within the four y<>ar'
after the eaus(' of action shall have accnwd.''
Tith~ 104-2-30, Utah Code Annotated J 9-!-:3.
In 1951 tlw Legislature enarted what is called th1• ·•judicial code" in which Title 10-i, among others, was n'pealed and the present statute was Pnacted. In vlace of
the section quoted abow, the Legislature provided that
there must be instituted \vithin four years "an action
for relief not otherwise provided for by la\\·." Othl'r
sections of the statutes of limitation \YPre not ehanged.
An examination of these other statutes reveals siwcific instancc>s wlwre the legi::;Jatun-- has provided that
the statute of limitations dol's not run until th<' vlaintiff'
discovers the facts whieh giye rise to his cause of action.
SPe 'J'itle 78-1:2-2(). The first :-;1•etion of that statute pro-
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vidPs that the cause of action for damages for injury
to n~al property "shall not be deemed to have accrued
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting such waste or trespass."
The next section of 78-12-26 provides the cause of
adion does not accrue until the owner of the livestock
in question "has actual knowledge of such facts as would
put a reasonable man upon inquiry ... "
It is interesting to note that the legislature did not

makP any provision for either actual discovery or "due
diligence" in the four-year statute governing personal
injury actions. The failure of the legislature so to do
has been held to be significant by the Supreme Court

of New Mexico in the malpractice case of Roybal v.

White, 383 P.2d 250 (1953), where the court held that
since the legislature enacted a discovery rule to apply
in some circumstances, the courts are not free to apply
a similar rule in other circumstances where the legis-

lature chooses not to. act. The court said:
"\Ve cannot supply what the legislature has
omitted. We are convinced that if the legislature
had intended the principle of discovery to apply
to tort actions, it would have specifically so provided, as it did with regard to discovery in cases
of fraud and in actions for injuries to or conversion of pro1wrty."
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The same result was reached in a case involving a spong-1·
left in a patient in Lindquist v. Mullen, 377 P.2d 7l~
(Wash. 1954), and in a case involving negligent trc>atment of a shoulder condition in Hill 1 Hays, :195 P.2rl
298 (Kan. 1964).
1•

The rulings of the above cases have been adopted,
m principh•, hy the Supreme Court of Utah in its 19011
decision of Auerbach v. Samnels, 349 P.2d 1112, in which
the plaintiff sought to avoid the effect of limitations in
an attempt to establish a constructive trust for unpaid
legacies claimed under a will. Citing 'J'itle 78-12-2(i,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, the Suprenw Court affirnw1l
a lower court dismissal of the action and hPld that in
the absence of extrinsic fraud, the statute of limitation~
runs from th<' time of the distribution of the <·stak
The court conclud0d:
"Even under the plaintiffs' theory of wron;;ful distribution and constructive trust, the period
within ·which an action must be commenced begin:.:
to run from the time the person entitled to tlw
property knows, or by reasonalJle diligence awl
inquiry should know, the r<~levant facts." (Emphasis supplied.)
The appellant attempts to avoid the holding of the
Roybal, Lindq1.tist, Hill and Auerl;ach cases by citinp;
Att.orney Genrral v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 42G, 73 P.2d 1271
(not 73 Utah 4G, 72 P.2d 1277 as cited by the aprwllant),
as standing for the proposition that tlw Court may ignor 1•
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the ah:wnce of a discovery rule in a statutory provision
ilnd snperimpose its own views in place of the missing
language. However, the case in no way supports the
aprwllant's contention. The case mPrely holds that the
statuk is tolled if the defendant conceals the cause of
action from the plaintiff. 'The case is in accord with the
wrll-established exceptions to the general rule in malpracti<·P eases and is not involvt>d in the instant case.

11 he appellant argues that despite the fact that the
lq.('islaturP enactt>d a discovery rule in some of the time
lirnitation statutes hut failPcl to do so in the applicable
statute, the legislature nevertheless intends the discovery
rnlP to apply. Tht> argumt'nt is based on conjecture, and
is eontrary to the Pstablished principles of statutory
construction. 1t is well established that where a partienlar provision is contained in one portion of the code
and is ahs~mt in another, the lt>gislature intended to ex<'lnd<' it from thP latter statute. Costello v. Farrrll, 48
N.W. 2d 557 (Minn. 1951); Blackeslee Storage W(lrelwuses, Inc. vs. City of Chicago, 17 N.E. 2d 1 (Ill. 1938).
l<'urth<>rrnore, when a statute has a long and consistent
construction by the courts, the failure of the legislature
to aJt<>r thP statute to preclude the construction is evidenee that it acquiesces in the construction. Alexander
1. Be11J1ctt, 5 Utah 2d 163, 298 P.2d 823, cc>rt. denied, 353
lT.~. D23 (195G); Da~iis v. Nru' York (!entral Railroad,
117 N.K 2d 39 (Ohio 1954); Fehr 1.-. General Accident
Fire and Life Assurance Corp., lG N.W. 2d 787 (Wisc.
19-1-1:).

2~

The limitation applicable in the instant case, Utah
Code Annotated 78-12-25 (1953), ·was amended in l~JjJ
without adding any provision for a discovery rule. t-lPt
Laws of Utah, 1951, Chapt<'r 58, SPction 3. It is estah
lished that when the legislature amends or re-Pnaet,
legislation using similar wording, it is implied that tlw
legislature intends to aic:cept the prior construction uf
the portions of the statute which are effectively ntained. Anderson v. Cook, 102 Utah 2(i5, 130 P.2d 2/-:
(1942); Jlfasich v. United States 8mclti11g, Refini11,r1 &
Mininq Co., 113 Ptah 101, 191 P.2d 612 (19+8).
CONCL(TSfON

It is graphically clear from appellant's own testimony that for more than ten years prior to the filing
of this suit, he had a problem of continuing pain, in a
small area which he could touch with his finger, that wa'
in the area of the operation in question, that he harl
ample opportunity to take action concerning it, but that
he simply failed to do anything about it. Even aftec
disco:vering the presence of the broken surgical need!•·
in 1962, appellant did not file this suit until three mor"

years had passed.
Under such circumstances, it is abundantly apparent
that, even under the more liberal rule followed by sorn 1•
states, appellant should be barred from 1iroceeding witl1
this action, and since the only Utah authority in point.
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tlw casP of Passey v. Budge, holds clearly that the statute
of limitations has run, the judgment of the lower court
\ras co1TPct and it sl1ould bP affirm Pd.

Respectfully submitted,

.JOHN H. SNO"W
Attorney for Def en(lwntsRespondents

701 Continental Bank Bldg.
8alt Lake City, Utah

